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"Hitherto I have been but the witness, little more; and I should
hardly think now to take another tone, that of your coadjutor, for
the time, did I not perceive in you,-at the crisis too-a troubled
hesitancy, proceeding, I doubt not, from the clash of military
duty with moral scruple-scruple vitalized by compassion."'
I.

INTRODUCTION

The very idea elicits jitters from lawyers and misgivings from judges. In
the eyes of all but the most nakedly partisan, to move for another lawyer's
disqualification and force a court to deprive a party of a chosen counselor
amounts to so aggressive a request and so radical a tonic as to be justified only
by the most irresistible reasons. The ethical lapse threatened, some seemingly
imply, must strike a reasonable observer as sufficiently grotesque and fateful
as to induce a blush from even jaded barristers before a lawyer should even
entertain the launching of such a portentous attack. The authority to do so may
be "incidental to all [c]ourts," as Chief Justice John Marshall opined in 1824,2
and a chosen lawyer's ejection may be a "prophylactic device for protecting

1.

Herman Melville, Billy Budd, in BILLY BUDD AND OTHER TALES 78-79 (Signet

Classics 2009). These words come from Captain Vere, who, having convened a court martial,
adroitly switches roles from judge to prosecutor to defense attorney to witness, the conflict
lawyer par excellence. See generally Richard Weisberg, How Judges Speak: Some Lessons on

Adjudication in Billy Bud, Sailor with an Application to Justice Rehnquist, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1(1982).
2.
Ex parte Burr, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 529, 531 (1824); see also, e.g., Chambers v.
NASCO, 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991) (citing case). That Marshall's words still echo is no surprise.
See, e.g., Amir Shachmurove, On Dicta's Trail: Espinosa's Messy Repercussions, NORTON
BANKR. L. ADVISER, Jan. 2018, at 1 (quoting Marshall).
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the attomey-client relationship," as Judge John Louis Coffey discoursed in
1982.3 But, in zealously opinionated hands, an adversarial posture once
treasured by the profession's foremost guardians' yet excoriated by the more
recent versions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,' an entreaty for
another's disqualification is but a baneful and baleful effort, poorlycamouflaged as a moral imperative, to delay proceedings or remove otherwise
competent counsel. Merely by its broaching the odds of a trial's delay surge
within an already besieged system, 6 as the conduct of the parties forfeits its
status as every participant's singular concern, and the alleged actions and
biases of the actors themselves become the most pressing subject of litigation.
With any litigant's cause ejected from its original limelight, all now turn to
parsing past connections and possible exposures and drawing reasonable
extrapolations-a court duty-bound to ascertain the existence of a
"compelling" justification7 or a lawyer's galling deployment of one of the
law's more nefarious "technique[s] of harassment."8
Riven by such discordant filaments and reliant on federal common law,
the Model Rules produced and published by the American Bar Association
("ABA"), and more than fifty jurisdictions' idiosyncratic iterations, the
federal courts' disqualification jurisprudence exhibits a bewildering opacity.
This is especially true as to one of the most frequently asserted and, as a
logical consequence, most readily abused and deflected grounds: conflict of
interest between a lawyer's former client and his or her current one, an
increasingly common occurrence due to the legal world's recent hyper-lateral

3.
Freeman v. Chi. Musical Instrument Co., 689 F.2d 715, 721 (7th Cir. 1982).
4.
See Paul C. Saunders, Whatever Happened to 'Zealous Advocacy'?, 245 N.Y. L.J.,
no. 47, Mar. 11, 2011 (discussing the abandonment of this value).
5.
FED. R. Civ. P. 1; cf, e.g., Covington v. Sailormen, Inc., 274 F.R.D. 692, 693 (N.D.
Fla. 2011) ("[B]oilerplate, shotgun-style objections are not consistent with the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedures' goal of securing 'the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action."' (citation omitted)); Gipson v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., No. 08-2017-EFM-DJW, 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 103822, at *4 (D. Kan. Dec. 23, 2008) ("This Court's goal, in accordance with Rule
1 [,] . . is to administer the [Rules] in a 'just, speedy and inexpensive' manner. To assist the
Court in accomplishing this goal, the parties are encouraged to resolve discovery and other
pretrial issues without the Court's involvement."); David J. Waxse, Cooperation-What Is It
and Why Do It?, 18 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 8, 15 (2012) ("There are now numerous opinions making
the same point about cooperation, yet it appears that cooperation is not being used enough as a
method of obtaining the 'just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of the action.").
6.
Cf Amir Shachmurove, Disruptions' Function: A Defense of (Some) Form
Objections under the FederalRules of Civil Procedure, 12 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 161, 163-64
(2016) (discussing the discovery system's deformation since the Rules' adoption in 1938).
7.
In re BellSouth Corp., 334 F.3d 941, 957 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing McCuin v. Tex.
Power & Light Co., 714 F.2d 1255, 1263 (5th Cir. 1983)).
8.
See GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 15 (2017).
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flurry.9 Indeed, between 1969 and 1989, the professional standards governing
conflicts of interest have only grown "longer," "more restrictive," and "more
complex."'o In spite of the resulting cacophony, however, guidelines can still
be derived, a foundation for analyzing cases thereby laid, and a bit of advice
dispensed for the brave few tempted to wander through this booby-trapped
landscape.
II.

TWICE-TOLD TALES: DISQUALIFICATION EDITION

A.

A Laborious Struggle"

After graduating from law school, Vere Rolland Forester ("VRF") joined
the law firm of Sindri & Vikngr ("S&V") as a labor and employment
associate. After years of impressive billing totals and a handful of courtroom
victories, VRF cemented his position as the firm's most experienced
employment litigator, winning partnership within a decade. In 2001, the firm's
management committee naturally assigned VRF to monitor the work of a team
of lawyers and paralegals ("Team One"). As requested, VRF attended many,
but not all, of the weekly meetings during which this coterie's attorneys spoke
about their ongoing projects. During this period, one associate, soon joined by
other S&V attorneys, embarked upon a compliance audit and employment law
review for a local home improvement company ("Company") and its
affiliates, including a troubled gutter fabrication and installation business
("Affiliate"). In ensuing conferences, she divulged details about her multiday
interviews with officers and managers at the Company's facilities.
Apparently, neither this associate nor Team One's nominal leader could
remember whether VRF attended the few meetings focused upon the
Company's internal data and mounting travails, and VRF repeatedly affirmed
his ignorance regarding S&V's investigation and representation of its
longtime client.
In 2002, VRF left S&V and set out to represent defendants and plaintiffs
in his area of special expertise: labor and employment law. In January 2004,
a crew chief for the Affiliate called several law firms to discuss a dispute he
had with his employer about overtime pay; only VRF's new firm showed even

9.
See J. Nick Badgerow, Conflicts and Confidentiality:Duties When a Lawyer Changes
Firms, J. KAN. B. Ass'N, Jan. 2010, at 21, 21 (opining as to this phenomenon).
10. Bruce A. Green, "Through a Glass, Darkly": How the Court Sees Motions to
Disqualify CriminalDefense Lawyers, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1201, 1213 (1989); see also Camden
v. Maryland, 910 F. Supp. 1115, 1124 (D. Md. 1996) (stressing this precedent's "blurr[iness]").
11. Edited for effect and ease, the scenario depicted in this subsection comes from a recent
appellate case.
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a modicum of interest in his case, enough to set up an initial meeting for
January 27, 2008. Apparently, only once VRF visited the Affiliate's
remodeled website after this meeting's scheduling did he discover its
affiliation with the Company. Still, ascribing little import to this fact, VRF
opted to arrange a lunch with a recently retired S&V partner, one with an
extensive knowledge of wage and hour law, on January 26, 2008. At this
prandial colloquy, these two friends debated wage and hour law and an
employer's possible defenses, including the motor carrier exemption to the
Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA").12 Upon meeting the crew chief and two
of his colleagues on January 27, 2008, VRF agreed to serve as their lead
counsel. Within two weeks, twenty employees, through VRF, filed a putative
class action against the Company.
VRF's prior association with S&V's large stable of lawyers, however,
had not yet ended. Instead, in March 2004, VRF received a brochure
advertising a June wage and hour law forum. The proposed presenters
included a former colleague with whom VRF was close-and S&V's lead
counsel for the Company and Affiliate in the crew chief's just-filed suit. For
an undisclosed reason, VRF spoke to the former, allegedly without soliciting
any theories, opinions, or advice.
After the plaintiffs, through VRF, filed a motion for conditional
certification of the action as a collective action in which S&V's alleged advice
prominently featured, the Company and Affiliate demanded VRF's
withdrawal. When he indignantly refused, these defendants sought his
disqualification. The district court honored their plea in a decision
unanimously affirmed on appeal.
B. A Collector'sSecrets 13
A native of Minnesota, the young attorney, commonly known as "AJ,"
established himself as a defense attorney with a nationwide practice in
Chicago. From February 1998 through March 2017, he defended sundry debt
collection agencies, credit furnishers, banks, credit card-based independent
service providers and other businesses from "countless" class actions
predicated on such federal statutes as the Fair Credit Reporting Act
("FCRA"), the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"), and the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA"). As he did so, he rose from
associate to partner at his first law firm before jumping ship to another shop,

12. 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(1) (2012).
13. The tale retold within this subsection borrows facts from several recent cases, with
details added and subtracted for literary effect.
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one with a similar repertoire of clients and hodgepodge of cases.
Unexpectedly, after a single season's tenure, this once rising defense star
switched sides and joined a plaintiffs' law firm with a thriving consumer
practice in the fall of 2017. Invigorated by this change, he soon enrolled as
counsel in a putative class action against BMS, one of the nation's newer
online-only banks, for various violations of the TCPA.
As soon emerged, both of AJ's firms had previously represented BMS in
similar cases, and AJ himself had previously dealt with BMS as an
unofficially aligned defendant's lead counsel. BMS had retained AJ's first
firm on seventy (70) matters, including consumer cases, and in several states,
over the prior decade. Lessening the sting of this fact, BMS' main contract sat
in another office, and it used the firm's Chicago-based attorneys, but not AJ,
on only twelve analogous cases. Even so, as a brief investigation promptly
revealed, AJ had represented one of BMS' third-party debt collectors in 2012,
regularly conferring with BMS' internal counsel and technicians so as to craft
an effective defense for his client and defending a BMS employee during one
acrimonious deposition at its request due to his steady exposure to such
closely-held knowledge. In addition, despite its brevity, AJ's months at the
second law firm featured his representation of another one of BMS'
contractors and, due to an indemnity provision, BMS itself. Although this
relationship lacked any obvious personal depth or warmth, regular emails and
calls between AJ and BMS hinted at more than a perfunctory association.
Having confirmed this fact, consternation seized BMS' general counseland impelled him to place a short call to his company's long-term outside
counsel. Several weeks later, in accordance with BMS' blunt request, its
attorney had prepared a rather overlong motion to disqualify. Once provided
a copy, AJ exploded. By phone and email, he angrily denied any knowledge
of BMS' internal procedures or confidential data. To a befuddled judge at an
unrelated hearing, he defended his integrity and emphasized his unfamiliarity
with his former employers' BMS cases. Even as AJ thusly thundered,
however, manic negotiations, once resisted by the determined plaintiffs,
finally commenced. Months later, with little fanfare, the parties filed an agreed
stipulation of dismissal with prejudice. Probably relieved at this motion's
submission, the seized jurist signed within the hour.
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III. STATE OF THE LAW

A.

English Beginnings

Within years of its emergence in the reign of England's Edward 1 (12721307),14 the medieval law of lawyering discerned a pressing need to sanction
a cavalcade of conflicted counselors.'" Over the next few centuries, two
statutes-the Statute of Westminster I, Chapter 29 (1275) ("Chapter 29"),16
and the Statute 4 Henry IV, Chapter 18 (1402) ("Chapter 18") 1-and
an
ordinance-the London Ordinance of 1280 ("1280 Ordinance")" provided
the regulatory anchor for any judicial punishment of a lawyer deemed to be
blithely indifferent to an apparent conflict of interest. The first fiduciary rule
applicable specifically to lawyers, Chapter 29 specifically criminalized
"ambidexterity," then defined as the act of taking retainers from opposing
sides in the same case,1 9 as well as "deceit or collusion" of the court or a party
at court. 20 A lawyer who perpetrated or consented to any such malevolence,
Chapter 29 sternly promogulated, would be imprisoned for a year and a day
and barred from further court appearances. 2' Adopted five years later, the
1280 Ordinance regulated admission to practice law in London's courts and
censured a variety of then-prevalent misdeeds, including ambidexterity. 22
"[P]erhaps the earliest antecedent of modern lawyer ethics codes," 23 this
detailed enactment explicitly expanded Chapter 29's prohibition against
taking money from both sides in litigation to include representations adverse
to former client. 24 Although its language could also be read as authorizing
punitive measures against ethically challenged lawyers, Chapter 18 chiefly

14. Paul A. Brand, The Origins ofthe English Legal Profession, 5 LAw & HIST. REv. 31,
44 (1987).
15. Jonathan Rose, The Ambidextrous Lawyer: Conflict ofInterest andthe Medieval and
Early Modern Legal Profession, 7 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 137, 138 (2000) [hereinafter

Rose, Ambidexterity]; cf Jonathan Rose, The Legal Profession in Medieval England: A History
ofRegulation, 48 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1, 3 (1998) [hereinafter Rose, Profession] ("The practice
of law is, and always has been, regulated.").

16.
17.

Statute of Westminster I, 1275, 3 Edw. I c. 29 (Eng.).
1402, 4 Hen. 4 c. 18 (Eng.).

18.
19.

Rose, Profession, supra note 15, at 63-64 (quoting London Ordinance of 1280).
Lester Brickman, The ContinuingAssault on the Citadel of Fiduciary Protection:

Ethics 2000's Revision ofModel Rule 1.5, 2003 U. ILL. L. REv. 1181, 1191-92.
20. Sande Buhai, Lawyers as Fiduciaries,53 ST. Louis U. L.J. 553, 559 (2009).
21. Raymond J. McKoski, The Truth Be Told: The Needfor a Model Rule Defining a
Lawyer's Duty of Candor to a Client, 99 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 73, 74 (2014).
22. Rose, Ambidexterity, supra note 15, at 146-47.

23.

Id. at 146.

24.

Buhai, supra note 20, at 559.
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focused on the admission of attorneys and on assuring their competence and
integrity and never proved useful as a means of regulating conflicts of interest
or other forms of lawyer misconduct. 25 Unwilling to limit themselves to these
fonts of authority, royal and local courts insisted upon their intrinsic ability to
discipline their own officers, including wayward counselors. 26 By Sir William
Blackstone's time, these customs and regulations had led to the propagation
of binding ethical commands derived from the woeful tales of Simon of Cley
and John of Mutford, of William of Wells and John of Upton. 27
By operation of the same process execrated by a notoriously pragmatical
jurist, 28 as medieval courts debated these and similar men's misdeeds, some
of their conclusions assumed the kingly guise of venerable obligations. 29
Some, like the rules regarding classic ambidexterity, quickly transformed into
ironclad prohibitions whose contravention would henceforth merit swift and
harsh castigation, while others endured as norms, often contractually and
consensually imposed, for decades, if not centuries. 30 In time, at least a
handful of the latter, such as the lawyer's "fiduciary" relationship to a client,
won first codification and then sanctification. 31 Ultimately, this haphazardly
developed ethical paradigm migrated to Britain's fledging American colonies.
To this day, the influence of these old customs on the ethics of this nation's
legal establishment remains "ubiquitous," 32 old and new schematics linked by
the desire to protect clients from a lawyer's "fraudulent and deceitful
conduct." 33 Crucially, despite these migrations and metamorphoses, one
proscription traceable to Chapter 29-that on conflicts of interest never lost

25. Rose, Ambidexterity, supra note 15, at 147-48.
26. PAUL BRAND, THE ORIGINS OF THE ENGLISH LEGAL PROFESSION 123-36, 138-41
(1992).
27. Rose, Ambidexterity, supra note 15, at 152-54, 160-61.
28. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897)
("It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the
time of Henry IV," from 1399 to 1413). Perhaps undercutting the latter, Holmes had described
"the life of the law" as "experience," not "logic," sixteen years earlier. OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
29. See generally Rose, Ambidexterity, supra note 15, at 151-80 (collecting and
appraising these medieval cases).
30. See id. at 158-60, 167 (differentiating between medieval courts' treatment of active
deceit and disloyalty).
31. Buhai, supra note 20, at 560; see also, e.g., Cinema 5 Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d
1384, 1386 (2d Cir. 1976) ("A lawyer's duty to his client is that of a fiduciary or trustee." (citing
Haftner v. Farkas, 498 F.2d 587, 589 (2d Cir. 1974); Spector v. Mermelstein, 361 F. Supp. 30,
38 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), modifiedon othergrnds., 485 F.2d 474 (2d Cir. 1973); RAYMOND L. WISE,
LEGAL ETHICS 256 (2d ed. 1966))).
32. Keith Swisher, The (Over)use ofAge and Custom in Legal Ethics, 52 VAL. U. L. REV.
165, 166 (2017).
33. Rose, Ambidexterity, supra note 15, at 180.
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its status as a most blameworthy form of misconduct within the law's ethical
canons.
B. Modern Law s GeneralStandard
1.

Sources ofDisqualificationLaw

Today, the authority of a federal court34 to disqualify an attorney rests on
three primary sources: (1) the rules of the particular federal district in which
an attorney appears, if any; (2) the relevant jurisdiction's ethical rules to the
extent, if any, incorporated into these local codes; and (3) federal common
law. 35 The first source-a district's local rules-effectively compels courts to
invoke the Model Rules,

36

which have now replaced the Canons of

Professional Ethics ("Canons"). 37 Courts often consult a second source-the
various states' ethical rules because many local rules' explicitly assimilate
state-based standards, 38 and any practicing lawyer, whether appearing in state
or federal court, must be barred in the state in which he or she practices. 39

34. In this Article, any reference to "Court," "court," "Courts," or "courts" is to one or
more federal courts unless otherwise noted.
35. See, e.g., Herrmann v. Gutterguard, Inc., 199 F. App'x 745, 752 (11th Cir. 2006);
Whitehouse v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the Dist. of R.I., 53 F.3d 1349, 1357 (1st Cir. 1995); United
States v. Claros, 17 F.3d 1041, 1046-47 (7th Cir. 1994); Greer's Refuse Serv. v. BrowningFerris Indus., 843 F.2d 443, 446 (11th Cir. 1988). Because the power to craft such local rules
arises from federal statutes and procedural rules, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1654, 2071; FED. R. Civ. P. 83,
it can be called "statutory." Frazier v. Heebe, 482 U.S. 641, 654 (1987); Whitehouse, 53 F.3d at
1357.
36. See, e.g., N.D. ILL. L.R. 83.50 ("Applicable disciplinary rules are the Model Rules
adopted by the American Bar Association."); Paloian v. Greenfield (In re Rest. Dev. Grp.), 402
B.R. 282, 290 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2009) (acknowledging this fact).
37. Green, supra note 10, at 1212. The Canons were largely derived from the common
law of agency. Id.
38. See, e.g., N.D. GA. R. 83.1(C), which states:
[a]ll lawyers practicing before this court shall be governed by and shall comply
with the specific rules of practice adopted by this court and, unless otherwise
provided, with the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct contained in the Rules
and Regulations of the State Bar of Georgia and with the decisions of this court
interpreting these rules and standards;
N.D. ILL. L.R. 83.50 ("[A] lawyer admitted to practice in Illinois is governed by the Illinois
Rules of Professional Conduct" whenever the Model Rules are silent or are inconsistent with the
latter code); Paul v. Judicial Watch, Inc., 571 F. Supp. 2d 17, 20 (D.D.C. 2008) (noting that
"[flederal district courts usually adopt the Rules of Professional Conduct of the states where
they are situated." (quoting Cole v. Ruidoso Mun. Sch., 43 F.3d 1373, 1383 (10th Cir. 1994))).
39. E.g., Galderma Labs., L.P. v. Actavis Mid Atl. LLC, 927 F. Supp. 2d 390, 394 (N.D.
Tex. 2013) (applying the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct "because they
govern attorneys practicing in Texas generally," in federal as much as state proceedings). This
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Apart from any such incorporation, two longstanding legal principles-first,
"motions to disqualify are substantive motions affecting the rights of the
parties"; 40 and second, "a federal court's authority to regulate lawyer conduct
in its own cases" arises "from its inherent power, not from a particular state
rule" 4' have long ensured the overall primacy of federal common law.42 in
fact, "[w]hether considered statutory or inherent in derivation," federal courts
have always possessed the broadly discretionary "power of erecting
reasonable prophylactic rules to regulate perceived abuses by attorneys
appearing before the[m]," including strictures as to disqualification, 43
assuming the prerequisites of due process are met. 44 In practice, since
appellate courts "grant substantial deference to a district court in the
interpretation and application of local district court rules," 45 and three
opinions by the Supreme Court Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord;46
Flanagan v. United States;47 and Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller48

incorporation explains why some courts maintain that "[m]otions to disqualify are governed by
two sources of authority." Herrmann, 199 F. App'x at 752.
40. Herrmann, 199 F. App'x at 752.
41. Silicon Graphics, Inc. v. ATI Techs., 741 F. Supp. 2d 970, 980 (W.D. Wis. 2010)
(citing In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 645 n.6 (1985)). However, if a district court bases its
disqualification order on an allegation of an ethical violation, "the court may not simply rely on
a general inherent power to admit and suspend attorneys, without any limit on such power," at
least according to some circuits. Schlumberger Techs. v. Wiley, 113 F.3d 1553, 1561 (11th Cir.
1997).
42. See, e.g., FDIC v. U.S. Fire Ins., 50 F.3d 1304, 1311-12 (5th Cir. 1995); Bd. of Educ.
v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1246 (2d Cir. 1979); Silicon Graphics, 741 F. Supp. 2d at 980.
43. Whitehouse v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the Dist. of R.I., 53 F.3d 1349, 1357 (1st Cir. 1995);
cf Culebras Enters. v. Rivera-Rios, 846 F.2d 94, 97 (1st Cir. 1988) ("It is well settled in this
circuit that the district court has the duty and responsibility to supervise the conduct of attorneys
who appear before it . . . ."). As one court observed, the very power to disbar necessarily includes
the authority to impose such lesser sanctions. Whitehouse, 53 F.3d at 1356; cf Chambers v.
NASCO, 501 U.S. 32, 45 (1991) (power to dismiss lawsuit for conduct abusing judicial process
includes the "less severe sanction" of imposing attorney's fees).
44. Schlaifer Nance & Co. v. Estate of Warhol, 194 F.3d 323, 334 (2d Cir. 1999) ("Due
process requires that courts provide notice and opportunity to be heard before imposing any kind
of sanctions." (quoting Ted Lapidus, S.A. v. Vann, 112 F.3d 91, 96 (2d Cir. 1997))).
45. United States v. Miller, 624 F.2d 1198, 1200 (3d Cir. 1980); accord Goldberg v.
Danaher, 599 F.3d 181, 183 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting In re Kandekore, 460 F.3d 276, 278 (2d
Cir. 2006)); Dority v. City of Chic., 50 F. App'x 760, 764 (7th Cir. 2002) (quoting Waldridge
v. Am. Hoescht Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 923 n. 4 (7th Cir. 1994)).
46. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 370 (1981) (holding that
"orders denying motions to disqualify counsel are not appealable final decisions under § 1291").
47. Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 260 (1984) (holding that "a District Court's
pretrial disqualification of defense counsel in a criminal prosecution is not immediately
appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291").
48. Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 440 (1985) (concluding that "orders
disqualifying counsel in civil cases, like orders disqualifying counsel in criminal cases and
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("Firestone Trilogy")-circumscribed review of disqualification orders, 49 a
trial court's decision as to this volatile issue seldom suffers reversal,
heightening the significance of its initial determination as to the necessity of
a particular lawyer's ouster to counsel and party.
For all this law's variability, these disparate sources' verifiable existence
should not obscure two truths relevant to any disqualification motion's
appraisal. First, the extant federal standard is "informed by multiple sources,
including state ethical rules." 0 As such, although federal common law still
independently supplies the regnant standard," its juridical formulation almost
perfectly echoes the Model Rules.5 2 Tellingly, this strong correlation in
elements and exposition has transformed into near perfect substantive
congruence after the adoption of Model Rule 1.9 in certain jurisdictions,
collapsing a once well-policed, if winding, doctrinal border.5 Second, most
states have chosen to incorporate the Model Rules into their own ethical
compendiums. 4 Even where not, courts look upon the Model Rules and their
drafters' official comments as "instructive" when interpreting the relevant

orders denying a motion to disqualify in civil cases, are not collateral orders subject to appeal as
'final judgments' within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291").
49. See Firestone, 449 U.S. at 378 n. 13. Essentially, such review can now only take place
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) or via mandamus in "exceptional circumstances." Id.
50. Silicon Graphics, Inc. v. ATI Techs., 741 F. Supp. 2d970, 980 (W.D. Wis. 2010); cf
Hempstead Video, Inc. v. Inc. Vill. of Valley Stream, 409 F.3d 127, 132 (2d Cir. 2005) ("[O]ur
decisions on disqualification motions often benefit from guidance offered by the American Bar
Association . . . and state disciplinary rules .... .").

51. See LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. Lake Cty., 703 F.2d 252, 255 (7th Cir. 1983); Brennan v.
Sun Healthcare Grp., No. IP 96-102-C-D/F, 1998 WL 1567451, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 29, 1998).
52. See, e.g., Watkins v. Trans Union, LLC, 869 F.3d 514, 519-20 (7th Cir. 2017); Selby
v. Revlon Consumer Prods. Corp., 6 F. Supp. 2d 577, 579 (N.D. Tex. 1997) (citing In re Am.
Airlines, Inc., 972 F.2d 605, 610 (5th Cir. 1992)); cf United States v. Humpherys, 57 M.J. 83,
87 (C.A.A.F. 2002) ("In general, the federal civilian courts have adopted Rule 1.9 as the national
standard governing attorneys and their disqualification.").
53. See, e.g., Watkins, 869 F.3d at 520 ("Rule 1.9 clarified and narrowed the contours of
an older federal common-law rule for attorney disqualification referred to as the 'substantial
relationship test."'); RehabCare Grp. E., Inc. v. Vill. Health Care Mgmt., No. 17-cv-1181-MJRSCW, 2018 WL 2075846, at *3 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 16, 2018) ("But as the Seventh Circuit has pointed
out in Watkins, the scope of the substantial relationship test was somewhat narrowed in Indiana
by the adoption of the Rules of Professional Conduct .... ).
54. See generally In re Am. Airlines, Inc., 972 F.2d at 610, 619 (finding the test for
conflicts to be the "same" under the state's code as under the Model Rules); Tucker v. George,
569 F. Supp. 2d 834, 837 (W.D. Wis. 2008) (noting that the Model Rules and Wisconsin's ethical
code are "essentially identical" (quoting Callas v. Pappas, 907 F. Supp. 1257, 1260 (E.D. Wis.
1995))); Andrew Corp. v. Beverly Mfg., 415 F. Supp. 2d 919, 923 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (observing
that Rules of Professional Conduct of the United States District for the Northern District of
Illinois "are patterned after the . . . Model Rules"); United States v. Hanhardt, 156 F. Supp. 2d
988, 999 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (same).
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state's "analogous" provisions." Perhaps for these reasons, the federal
judiciary still struggles with determining to what extent violations of ethical
rules ought to be dispositive or even relevant in litigation,5 6 still regularly
frustrated at the "blurry" contours endemic within this "area of law and
ethics."

7

2.

Relevant Concerns

If a party-litigant desires to bring the issue of conflict of interest or breach
of an ethical duty to a court's attention, a motion to disqualify is the axiomatic
and principal method." Procedurally, the filing of such an explosive
application triggers a two-step process in which a court considers whether (1)
an ethical violation has actually occurred and (2) disqualification is the
appropriate remedy.5 9 Even if a movant proves a decided violation,

disqualification does not automatically follow under either federal law 60 or

the Model Rules. 61 Instead, loath to wade into any ethically charged morass,

55. Teja v. Saran, 846 P.2d 1375, 1378 n.4 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993); see also State v.
Hunsaker, 873 P.2d 540, 544-45 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) ("[W]hile the commentary to the
[Model R]ules have [sic] not been formally adopted in this state, the commentary is instructive
in exploring the underlying policy of the rules." (citing Teja, 846 P.2d at 1378 n.4)).
56. Compare CenTra, Inc. v. Estrin, 538 F.3d 402, 410-11 (6th Cir. 2008) (explaining
that the Rules of Professional Conduct are probative, but not dispositive), and Musa v. Gillette
Commc'ns of Ohio, Inc., 641 N.E.2d 233, 236 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994) ("[A] violation of the Code
of Professional Responsibility alone should not result in disqualification unless disqualification
is found to be absolutely necessary." (citing Centimark Corp. v. Brown Sprinkler Serv., Inc.,
620 N.E.2d 134, 137 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993))), with Lennartson v. Anoka-Hennepin Indep. Sch.
Dist. No. 11, 662 N.W.2d 125, 134-35 (Minn. 2003) (turning to rule after defending it as
addressing all relevant ethical concerns), and In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 124 F. Supp. 2d
235, 250 (D.N.J. 2000) (describing the state's and district's ethical rules as "the bedrock of
professional conduct" (quoting Reardon v. Marlayne, Inc., 416 A.2d 852, 860 (N.J. 1980))).
57. Camden v. Maryland, 910 F. Supp. 1115, 1124 (D. Md. 1996).
58. Hamrick v. Union Twp., 79 F. Supp. 2d 871, 874 (S.D. Ohio 1999) (citing Musicus
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 621 F.2d 742, 744 (5th Cir. 1980)); see also Big Idea Co. v. Parent
Care Res., LLC, No. 2:11-cv- 1148, 2012 WL 4057216, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 14, 2012) (relying
on Hamrick, 79 F. Supp. 2d at 874).
59. Hicks v. Bruegge (In re SLM Trans, Inc.), No. 09-cv-0993-MJR, 2010 WL 2739996,
at *8 (S.D. Ill. July 12, 2010) (citing Paloian v. Greenfield (In re Rest. Dev. Grp.), 402 B.R. 282,
289 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2009)); Guillen v. City of Chicago, 956 F. Supp. 1416, 1421 (N.D. Ill.
1997).
60. United States v. Miller, 624 F.2d 1198, 1201(3d Cir. 1980); SWS Fin. Fund A v.
Salomon Bros., 790 F. Supp. 1392, 1400 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (quoting Miller, 624 F.2d at 1201).
61. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. (AM. BAR. Ass'N 2017); In re Rest. Dev.
Grp., 402 B.R. at 290; Myers v. Porter (In re Estate of Myers), 130 P.3d 1023, 1025 (Colo.
2006) ("Violation of an ethical rule, in itself, is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for
disqualification.").
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courts only reluctantly levy this "drastic measure" 62 and evade both
"speculation" 63 and treating disqualification as merely an anodyne form of
punishment or discipline. 64 Due to this diffidence, judicial disfavor tends to
greet these increasingly popular motions, especially if filed after the passing
of an extended period or on the eve of trial. 65
In this analytical battlefield, equally sacred precepts duel. 66
"[D]isqualification of counsel" may occasionally be "both legitimate and
necessary," critically essential for protecting the attorney-client relationship
by preventing "the potential breach of . .. confidences." 67 For this reason,
"the threat or potential threat that confidences may be disclosed" can be
"enough" to justify such a decision.68 Yet, this selfsame medicine "serves to
destroy a relationship by depriving a party of representation of their own
choosing" and leads to inevitable postponements, 69 while "a litigant should
not be permitted to utilize a disqualification issue as part of his [or her] trial

62. Freeman v. Chi. Musical Instrument Co., 689 F.2d715, 721 (7th Cir. 1982); see, e.g.,
Cromley v. Bd. of Educ., 17 F.3d 1059, 1066 (7th Cir. 1994) (quoting Freeman, 689 F.2d at
721); Mercury Vapor Processing Techs. v. Vill. of Riverdale, 545 F. Supp. 2d 783, 787 (N.D.
Ill. 2008) (quoting Owen v. Wangerin, 985 F.2d 312, 317 (7th Cir. 1993); Freeman, 689 F.2d at
721-22)).
63. Hickman v. Burlington Bio-Med. Corp., 371 F. Supp. 2d 225, 229 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)
(citing Peacock Holdings, Inc. v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins., No. 94-CV-5023, 1996 WL 285435, at
*8 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
64. See People v. Garcia, 698 P.2d 801, 806 (Colo. 1985) (en banc); Schuff v. A.T.
Klemens & Son, 16 P.3d 1002, 1012 (Mont. 2000) ("[T]he disqualification of an attorney or
firm, or any other sanction, based solely on a rule violation absent sufficient proof of
prejudice would likely exceed a district court's jurisdiction, in that the sanction would be
nothing more than a means of 'punishing' the attorney or firm for the violation.").
65. E.g., Talecris Biotherapeutics, Inc. v. Baxter Int'l Inc., 491 F. Supp. 2d 510, 513 (D.
Del. 2007); see also Gregori v. Bank of Am., 254 Cal. Rptr. 853, 859 n.6 (Ct. App. 1989) (noting
the increase); Keith Swisher, The Practice and Theory ofLawyer Disqualification,27 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 71, 75 (2014) (describing the judiciary's penchant for "shunning" such motions
over the last thirty years). Data for both sides can be found. James B. Kobak, Jr., Dealing with
Conflicts and DisqualificationRisks Professionally, 44 HOFSTRA L. REv. 497, 497 (2015).
66. See Tessier v. Plastic Surgeries Specialists, Inc., 731 F. Supp. 724, 729 (E.D. Va.
1990) ("There must be a balance between the client's free choice of counsel and the maintenance
of the highest ethical and professional standards in the legal community." (citing In re Asbestos
Cases, 514 F. Supp. 914, 925 (E.D. Va. 1981)).
67. Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co. v. Norton Co., 113 F.R.D. 588, 591 (D. Minn. 1986).
68. Id. (first citing Kearns v. Fred Lavery Porsche Audi Co., 745 F.2d 600 (Fed. Cir.
1984); then citing Arkansas v. Dean Foods Prods. Co., 605 F.2d 380 (8th Cir. 1979), overruled
on other grounds by In re Multi-Piece Rim Prods. Liab. Litig., 612 F.2d 377 (8th Cir. 1980);
and then citing United States v. Shepard, 675 F.2d 977 (8th Cir. 1982)); see also, e.g., Grioli v.
Delta Int'l Mach. Corp., 395 F. Supp. 2d 11, 14 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) ("[D]isqualification may be
particularly appropriate where there is the potential that confidences may have been disclosed
[by an expert or an attorney].").
69. Freeman v. Chi. Musical Instrument Co., 689 F.2d 715, 721-22 (7th Cir. 1982).
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strategy." 70 After all, "a party is presumptively entitled to the counsel of his
choice." 7 ' Accordingly, such motions "must be viewed with extreme
caution .. ., for their use can serve tactical or harassment purposes as opposed
to the more righteous goal of protecting the attorney-client relationship." 72 In
general, the balance between these conflicting ends is a delicate one: while all
reasonable doubts must be resolved in favor of disqualification, 73 the party
seeking disqualification bears the heavy burden to conclusively demonstrate
the facts which compel that end. 74 Distilled, this body of law impels a court
to resolve a motion to disqualify by weighing "the need to maintain the highest
standards of the [legal] profession," "a client's right to freely choose his
counsel," and "the public's interest in the scrupulous administration of
justice" upon some nontangible scale.75

70. Potashnick v. Port City Constr. Co., 609 F.2d 1101, 1115 (5th Cir. 1980); cf United
States v. Kelly, 888 F.2d 732, 746 (11th Cir. 1989) ("[A] recusal issue may not be abused as an
element of trial strategy.").
71. In re BellSouth Corp., 334 F.3d 941, 961 (11th Cir. 2003); see also Herrmann v.
GutterGuard, Inc., 199 F. App'x 745, 752 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting In re BellSouth Corp., 334
F.3d at 961) (citing this language).
72. Golson-Dunlap v. Am. Motorists Ins., No. 1:05-cv-1191-JDT-TAB, 2007 WL
925260, at *6 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 26, 2007) (citing Freeman, 689 F.2d at 721-22); see also, e.g.,
Tese-Milner v. Beeler (In re Hampton Hotel Inv'rs, L.P.), 289 B.R. 563, 583 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2003) ("[I]n considering a motion to disqualify, a court must take into account 'a client's right
freely to choose his counsel . . . which . . . must be balanced against the need to maintain the

highest standards of the profession."' (quoting Gov't of India v. Cook Indust., 569 F.2d 737,
739 (2d Cir. 1978))).
73. Whiting Corp. v. White Mach. Corp., 567 F.2d713,715 (7th Cir. 1977); United States
v. Goot, 894 F.2d 231, 235 (7th Cir. 1990) (quoting LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. County of Lake, 703
F.2d 252, 257 (7th Cir. 1983)).
74. See Guillen v. City of Chi., 956 F. Supp. 1416, 1421 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (citing Lanigan
v. Resolution Tr. Corp., No. 91 C 7216, 1992 WL 350688, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 23, 1992));
Weeks v. Samsung Heavy Indus., 909 F. Supp. 582, 583 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (citing Lanigan, 1992
WL 350688, at *1). In a strange departure, a movant labors under a slightly lighter load under
federal common law than most states levy, as it need not demonstrate actual prejudice to justify
any disqualification. In re Am. Airlines, Inc., 972 F.2d 605, 611 (5th Cir. 1992); see also Foster
Poultry Farms v. Conagra Foods Refrigerated Foods Co., No. F 04-58 10 AWI LJO, 2005 WL
2319186, at *9 n.2 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2005) (emphasizing this difference).
75. E.g., Hull v. Celanese Corp., 513 F.2d 568, 570 (2d Cir. 1975) (enumerating all three);
Steel v. Gen. Motors Corp., 912 F. Supp. 724, 733 (D.N.J. 1995) (quoting Dewey v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 536 A.2d 243, 244 (N.J. 1988)) (listing first two); see also, e.g., Emle
Indus. v. Patentex, 478 F.2d 562, 564-65 (2d Cir. 1973) ("We approach our task as a reviewing
court in this case conscious of our responsibility to preserve a balance, delicate though it may
be, between an individual's right to his own freely chosen counsel and the need to maintain the
highest ethical standards of professional responsibility.").
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As these admonitions suggest, "[d]isqualification questions are intensely
fact-specific." 76 This cautious methodology aligns with the general axiom
that, "[w]hen dealing with ethical principles,... [courts] cannot paint with
broad strokes." 7 7 Because the situations subject to these commands "do not
arise in a vacuum," 78 the law's "ethical rules should not be blindly applied
without consideration of relative hardships." 79 With disqualification in
particular, "it is essential to approach such problems with a keen sense of
practicality as well as a precise picture of the underlying facts," 0 "painstaking
analysis of the facts"" and a "cautious scrutiny" 82 demanded. In light of these
factors, any decision to disqualify "may not be rested on mere speculation that
a chain of events whose occurrence theoretically could lead counsel to act
counter to his [or her] client's interests might in fact occur." 83 Rather, "some
stronger objective indicator . .. than simple judicial intuition is needed,"8 4
some certain proof that "the independent professional judgment of the lawyer
is likely to be affected." 5 Standing alone, even though a "lawyer's duty of
loyalty long has precluded the representation of conflicting interests"86 and
the assessment required for ruling upon disqualification motion cannot be

&

76. Gould, Inc. v. Mitsui Mining & Smelting Co., 738 F. Supp. 1121, 1124 (N.D. Ohio
1990) (citing Huntington v. Great W. Res., Inc., 655 F. Supp. 565, 567 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)); see
also, e.g., Huntington, 655 F. Supp. at 567 (citing Samuel R. Miller & Irwin H. Warren, Conflicts
of Interest and Ethical Issues for the Inside and Outside Counsel, 40 Bus. LAW. 631, 633
(1985)).
77. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 136 F. Supp. 345, 367 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); see also,
e.g., United States v. Hasarafally, 529 F.3d 125, 128 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing Standard Oil Co.,
136 F. Supp. at 367).
78. Carlyle Towers Condo. Ass'n v. Crossland Say., FSB, 944 F. Supp. 341, 345 (D.N.J.
1996).
79. Gould, 738 F. Supp. at 1124.
80. Id. at 1124; see also Carlyle Towers Condo. Ass'n, 944 F. Supp. at 345 (quoting
Gould, 738 F. Supp. at 1124).
81. Satellite Fin. Planning Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank of Wilmington, 652 F. Supp. 1281,
1283 (D. Del. 1987) (quoting Duncan v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 646 F.2d 1020,
1029 (5th Cir. 1981)).
82. Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Pan Am. World Airways, 103 F.R.D. 22, 28 (D.D.C. 1984).
83. Shaffer v. Farm Fresh, Inc., 966 F.2d 142, 145 (4th Cir. 1992) (citing Aetna Cas.
Sur. Co. v. United States, 570 F.2d 1197, 1200-02 (4th Cir. 1978)); see also, e.g., United States
v. Perry, 30 F. Supp. 3d 514, 535-36 (E.D. Va. 2014) (quoting Shaffer, 966 F.2d at 145); Reese
v. Va. Int'l Terminals, Inc., 894 F. Supp. 2d 665, 671 (E.D. Va. 2012) (same).
84. Shaffer, 966 F.2d at 145-46; see also, e.g., Guillen v. City of Chic., 956 F. Supp.
1416, 1422-23 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (collecting cases similarly concluding).
85. Sanford v. Virginia, 687 F. Supp. 2d 591, 603 (E.D. Va. 2009).
86. Chauffers, Teamsters & Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 586 (1990).
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made with "hair-splitting nicety,"1 7 neither "judicial intuition"" nor
"surmise" 89 suffice in light of "the ever-present threat of human cupidity in
all the affairs of life"90 and the undammed flood of disqualification motions
first noticed in 1975.91
C. Routes to Disqualification
1.

Overview: RecognizedBases for an Attorney's Removal
a.

The August Ten

Over the last forty years, federal and state courts have recognized ten
grounds for a counselor's disqualification: (1) concurrent client conflicts of
interest; (2) personal interest conflicts; (3) former client conflicts of interest;
(4) receipt of confidential, privileged, or stolen information; (5) imputed
misconduct, including conflicts of interest; (6) lawyers as witnesses; (7)
contact with a represented party; (8) misconduct with witnesses; and (9) any
unspecified misconduct deemed bothersome or troubling. The first three
constitute the cynosure of conflicts jurisprudence, with both the fourth and
fifth subsumed therein. 92 A tenth ground (10) appearance of impropriety
has lost much of its efficacy in recent years, perhaps due to its absence from
the Model Rules' operative text. 93 Despite this official extirpation, 94 however,
many tribunals consider themselves "entitled to consider the entire course of
counsel's conduct in applying the relevant rules of professional conduct" and
thus treat "the appearance of impropriety ... [as] an important

87. United States v. Clarkson, 567 F.2d 270, 273 n.3 (4th Cir. 1977) (citing United States
v. Trafficante, 328 F.2d 117, 120 (5th Cir. 1964)); see also Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 570 F.2d at
1202 (suggesting that disqualification motions require more than a mechanical and didactic
application of the relevant ethical rules (citing Int'l Elec. Corp. v. Flanzer, 527 F.2d 1288, 128990 (2d Cir. 1975))).
88. Shaffer, 966 F.2d at 146.
89. Sanford, 687 F. Supp. 2d at 603.
90. Shaffer, 966 F.2d at 146.
91. See Int'l Elec. Corp., 527 F.2d at 1289.
92. See infra Section III.C.1.b.
93. See Waters v. Kemp, 845 F.2d 260, 265 (11th Cir. 1988) (declining to invoke standard
as it is not included in the Model Rules); but see TQ Delta, LLC v. 2Wire, Inc., No. 13-1835RGA, 2016 WL 5402180, at *2 (D. Del. Sept. 26, 2016) (quoting Kabi Pharmacia AB v. Alcon
Surgical, Inc., 803 F. Supp. 957, 960 (D. Del. 1992)) (invoking standard).
94. In re Cabe & Cato, Inc., 524 B.R. 870, 887 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2014); see also, e.g.,
Ganobsek v. Performing Arts Ctr. Auth., No. 99-6163-CIV-RYSKAMP/VITUNAC, 2000 WL
390106, at *4 n.5 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 24, 2000).
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consideration." 95 To them, this amorphous notion remains crucial "to
protecting the integrity of the judicial system," 96 liable to reemerge in
unexpected placeS 97 and trigger extended, if esoteric, exposition. 98 Practically
speaking, none of the foregoing bases are mutually exclusive. 99 Certainly, in
an evidentiary sense, the same facts can support more than one ground.'o
b.

The Pliability of the Law's Favored Ground for
Disqualification: "Conflicts ofInterest"

In recent years, most cases in which conflicts have been found fall into
two inexact categories. Generally, a cognizable conflict exists whenever
"there is a significant risk that the representation ... will be materially limited
by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a former client, or a third
person."' 0 ' Cases within the first agglomeration suggest counsel's
inattentiveness or spotty due diligence, more often than not as to matters
handled at the same firm long ago or work performed by laterals in the past
and at other firms. This frequent inattentiveness leads to a corresponding
failure to react promptly after the issue has become known. Not infrequently,
this jurisprudence's strict imputation rule1 02 only exacerbates the
consequences of this unhappy chain reaction.' 03 The second common class
encompasses cases in which courts exhibit unease, only occasionally fatal,
with a single firm undertaking concurrent representation of multiple
subsidiaries of a single corporate entity in separate cases. As one such court

95. In re Cabe, 524 BR. at 887; see also, e.g., Norman v. Elkin, No. 06-005-LPS, 2014
WL 556081, at *7 (D. Del. Feb. 10, 2014) ("Avoiding the appearance of impropriety is an
important consideration for the Court, as it relates to protecting the integrity of the judicial
system.").
96. In re Cabe, 524 B.R. at 887.
97. See Armor Screen Corp. v. Storm Catcher, Inc., 709 F. Supp. 2d 1309, 1319 (S.D.
Fla. 2010) (noting Florida state courts' continued reliance on this standard despite the state's
adoption of the Model Rules).
98. See Armor Screen Corp., 709 F. Supp. 2d at 1318-20 (discussing the debate). Rather
than resolving this tension, some courts evaded the issue. See First Impressions Design & Mgmt.
v. All That Style Interiors, Inc., 122 F. Supp. 2d 1352, 1355 n.1 (S.D. Fla. 2000); Welt v. Chub
Cay Club Assocs. (In re Patrick Power Corp.), Nos. 06-12423-BKC-JKO, 07-01175-BKC-JKO,
2007 WL 2883179, at *3-4 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Sept. 26, 2007).
99. See W.R. Grace & Co. v. Gracecare, Inc., 152 F.R.D. 61, 65 (D. Md. 1993) (relying
on at least two of these bases).
100. See infra Part IV.
101. NuStar Farms, LLC v. Zylstra, 880 N.W.2d 478, 482 (Iowa 2016) (quoting IOWA R.
PROF'L CONDUCT 32:1.7(a)(2)).
102. See infra Section III.C.2.d.iii.
103. See j2 Global Commc'ns, Inc. v. Captaris, Inc., No. CV 09-04150 DDP (AJWx), 2012
WL 6618272, at *9-11 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2012).
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conceded, "modem business practices in this age of parent companies with
worldwide subsidiaries, mergers and acquisitions" have made "this .

.

. issue

one of great importance."' 04
The types of conflicts confronted by courts in these cases can be placed
into one of four categories: (1) positional conflicts; (2) concurrent client
conflicts; (3) former client conflicts; and (4) prospective client conflicts.
Rarely-deemed problematic outside of the criminal context, 05 a "positional
conflict" arises whenever an attorney takes a formal position in a matter not
involving a client that may nevertheless be contrary to a position deemed
important to the client in other matters. 106 "Ordinarily," however, "a lawyer
may take inconsistent legal positions in different tribunals at different times
on behalf of different clients" unless concrete and discernible harm can be
shown.1 07 Regnant everywhere but Texas, the rule applicable to "concurrent
client conflicts" bars a lawyer from acting adversely to a current client on any
matter.108 Under the Model Rules, this prohibition is triggered whenever
"there is a significant risk that the representation . .. will be materially limited
by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a former client, or a third
person."' 09 Notably, as this doctrine derives from the duty of loyalty, its
proponents 110 ascribe no relevance to whether the matters at hand are entirely
unrelated to the work the lawyer is doing for the client and whether the
representation involves no possible exploitation of a client's confidence.
Instead, "[e]ven though the simultaneous representations may have nothing in
common, and there is no risk that confidences to which counsel is a party in
the one case have any relation to the other matter, disqualification may
nevertheless be required.""' With respect to former clients, based primarily
on the duty of confidentiality and secondarily on the duty of loyalty, the

104. McKesson Info. Sols. v. Morris, No. 2006CV121110, 2006 Ga. Super. LEXIS 127,
at *5-6 (Ga. Super. Ct. Nov. 8, 2006).
105. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 129(a)-(b) (AM.
LAW INST. 2000); see also Scott v. State, 991 So. 2d 971, 977 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)
(applying the Restatement).
106. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 128; see
also Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Applera Corp., 468 F. Supp. 2d 359, 365 (D. Conn. 2007) (citing
CONN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 24 (2007) (distinguishing between positional and

direct conflicts)).
107. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 24 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2017) (emphasis

added).
108. Id. at r. 1.7(a).
109. Nustar Farms, LLC v. Zylstra, 880 N.W.2d 478, 481 (Iowa 2016).
110. Flatt v. Superior Court, 885 P.2d 950, 955 (Cal. 1994) (en banc).
111. Id.; see

also Goss

Graphics

Sys.,

Inc.

v.

Man

Roland

Druckmaschinen

Aktiengesellschaft, No. COO-0035 MJM, 2000 WL 34031492, at *5 (N.D. Iowa May 25, 2000)
(quoting Flatt, 885 P.2d at 955).
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prevailing rule discerns a conflict whenever a substantial relationship exists
between matters or the attorney once enjoyed access to confidential
information material to his or her current litigation. Prospective clients, i.e.,
persons who consult with an attorney about the possibility of forming a clientlawyer relationship but ultimately decide otherwise," 2 benefit from a similar,
albeit more liberal, variant of this common law and regulatory decree. 113
Simply put, that attorney cannot "represent a client with interests materially
adverse to those of a prospective client in the same or a substantially related
matter if the lawyer received information from the prospective client that
could be significantly harmful to that person in the matter,"1 4 Subject to
exceptions specified in Model Rule 1.18(d)." To wit, "[r]ather than merely
receive confidential information, as is necessary for disqualification in the
former client context, . . . [a] lawyer must have received information that is
'significantly harmful' to . . . [a] former prospective client" to face the

prospect of disqualification.116
2.

PrevalentTests
a.

The Simple Tests

The sixth, seventh, eighth, and ninth common bases for disqualification
have yielded little doctrinal controversy." 7 According to a broad consensus,
the prohibition on lawyers serving as both advocates and witnesses (#6)
applies only to the extent that the attorney possesses otherwise unavailable
testimony as to "an essential element" or qualifies as a "necessary witness.""
The no-contact rule's adjudication (#7) requires little more than confirmation
of a lawyer's attempt to reach out to the opposing party or its employees. 119

112. See Dahleh v. Mustafa, No. 17 C 8005, 2018 WL 1167675, at *2 (N.D. Ill. signed
Mar. 5, 2018) (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.18(a)).
113. Dahleh, 2018 WL 1167675, at *2; cf Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee
Corp., 580 F.2d 1311, 1319 (7th Cir. 1978) ("The fiduciary relationship existing between lawyer
and client extends to preliminary consultation by a prospective client with a view to retention of
the lawyer, although actual employment does not result.").
114. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.18(c); see also Dahleh, 2018 WL 1167675,
at *2 (discussing this rule).
115. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.18(d).
116. Dahleh, 2018 WL 1167675, at *2.
117. See supra Section III.C.1
118. United States v. Dyess, 231 F. Supp. 2d 493, 496 (S.D. W. Va. 2002) (citing MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.7); Main Events Prods., LLC v. Lacy, 220 F. Supp. 2d 353,
355-57 (D.N.J. 2002) (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.7).
119. See Camden v. Maryland, 910 F. Supp. 1115, 1120 (D. Md. 1996). Though the fear
that a lawyer may have unethically gained privileged or confidential information underlies this
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Misconduct with witnesses (#8) includes an endless expanding catalogue of
horrors, including promising monetary incentives or outright bribery, rarely
tricky in application. The final catch-all category (#9) "other misconduct"can include bribery of jurors and even judges, its flexibility preventing its
reduction into a workable standard. As to conflicts between a lawyer and a
former client, however, two tests and two bases dominate most
disqualification disputes.
Substantial Relationship Test: Federal Common Law
Model Rule 1.9(a)

&

b.

i.

Elements

Rooted in a lawyer's duties of loyalty and confidentiality, and derived
from the venerable T. C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures,120 the
"substantial relationship test" appears in Model Rule 1.9(a),121 having been
lined by several circuits as federal common law prior to its promulgation.1 22
Distilled to its quiddity, this test grew from the broad desire to avert a lawyer
from "switch[ing] sides in substantially related representations"1 23 but serves
at least three identifiable purposes: (1) preventing disclosure of client
confidences, (2) protecting a client's interest in the loyalty of counsel, and (3)
preventing the "unsavory appearance of conflict of interest that is difficult to

prohibition, courts often opt for lesser sanctions than disqualification. See Faison v. Thornton,
863 F. Supp. 1204, 1215 (D. Nev. 1993) (discussing these various policing methods).
120. 113 F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
121. Model Rule 1.9(a) reads:
[a] lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter
represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that
person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the
former client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.9. In essence, "Rule 1.9 is merely a codification of the
T.C. Theatre test." Exterior Sys., Inc. v. Noble Composites, Inc., 175 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1115
(N.D. Ind. 2001). Indeed, the only notable difference between the two standards is that the Model
Rule adds a requirement that the former client had not consented. See Apeldyn Corp. v. Samsung
Elecs. Co., 660 F. Supp. 2d 557, 561 (D. Del. 2009). However, because courts typically look to
consent as a factor, this formal difference matters not at all in practice. See Westinghouse Elec.
Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 221, 228 (7th Cir. 1978) (discussing Canon 4); Fund of Funds,
Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 567 F.2d 225, 230 (2d Cir. 1977) (considering consent of the
client).
122. See Watkins v. Trans Union, LLC, 869 F.3d 514, 519-20 (7th Cir. 2017); Griffith v.
Taylor, 937 P.2d 297, 301 n.8 (Alaska 1997); In re Steveon R.A., 537 N.W.2d 142, 144 (Wis.
1995); Bergeron v. Mackler, 623 A.2d 489, 493 (Conn. 1993).
123. Nelson v. Green Builders, Inc., 823 F. Supp. 1439, 1446 (E.D. Wis. 1993).
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dispel in the eyes of the lay public-or for that matter the bench and bar."1 24
In its most commonly utilized version, the substantial relationship approach
pays heed to two elements.
Naturally, a movant must first prove the existence of an attorney-client
relationship. Notably, such an association may be predicated on the
performance of sundry types of legal work, including "the representation of a
client in court proceedings, advice to a client, and any action on a client's
behalf that is connected with the law."1 25 With no formal contract required,
"[t]he attorney-client relationship can be express or implied through formal
or informal consent."1 26 In particular, a party establishes an implied attorneyclient relationship if it shows that (1) it submitted confidential information to
a lawyer and (2) that it did so with the reasonable belief that the lawyer was
acting as the party's attorney; the client's belief is key. 127 Of course, a court
can find an implied relationship after considering any number of other factors,
such as the nature of the work performed, the circumstances in which
confidential information was exchanged, and the attorney's pattern of
conduct.1 28 By custom, no requirement for mutual consent yet exists.1 29
Next, the movant must show that the lawyer could have obtained
confidential information in the first that would have been relevant in the
second. 3 0 For purposes of this second factor, "[r]elevance must be gauged by
the violations alleged in the complaint and an assessment of the evidence
useful in establishing those allegations."' 3 ' In such cases, a court simply looks
to whether "the potential avenues of proof," rather than "the expected" ones,
intersect for purposes of establishing any past communication's instant
relevance. 132 Thusly viewed, the rule "does not necessarily involve any

124. Analytica, Inc. v. NPD Research, Inc., 708 F.2d 1263, 1266, 1269 (7th Cir. 1983).
125. Hamrick v. Union Twp., 79 F. Supp. 2d 871, 875 (S.D. Ohio 1999) (citing Landis v.
Hunt, 610 N.E.2d 554, 558 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992)).
126. Sailsbery v. Vill. of Sauk Vill., No. 15 C 10564, 2016 WL 1402291, at *4 (N.D. Ill.
Apr. 11, 2016).
127. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311, 1320 (7th Cir. 1978).
128. Black Rush Mining, LLC v. Black Panther Mining, 840 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1090 (N.D.
Ill. 2012).
129. United States v. Evans, 954 F. Supp. 165, 167 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (citing Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 580 F.2d at 1317).
130. See Watkins v. Trans Union, LLC, 869 F.3d 514, 519-20 (7th Cir. 2017); Analytica,
Inc. v. NPD Research, Inc., 708 F.2d 1263, 1266 (7th Cir. 1983).
131. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 221, 226 (7th Cir. 1978), cited
in, e.g., Bartlett v. Bartlett, No. 16 CV 6595, 2016 WL 7374276, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 20, 2016).
132. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 588 F.2d at 226. One court succinctly and correctly set out
its obligation:
[O]ur task is to concentrate on the factual contours of the transactions or matters
at issue and to ask whether the lawyers would have or reasonably could have
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inquiry into the imponderables involved in the degree of relationship between
the two matters but instead involves a realisticappraisalof the possibility that
confidences had been disclosed in the one matter which will be harmful to the
client in the other."' 33 Logically and realistically, evidence establishing the
likelihood that confidential information was once communicated satisfies
both prerequisites of the substantial-relationship test.
ii.

Breadth: Rebuttable Presumption

Upon proving the foregoing elements, "a presumption arises that the
lawyer received confidential information during his or her prior
representation" in most circuits.134 In fact, "[i]mplicit in a finding of
substantial relationship is a presumption that particular individuals in a law
firm freely share their client's confidences with one another."' 35 Irrebuttable
in certain circuits and per certain state codes, 3 6 this presumption may be
negated in others if "the lawyer whose change of employment created the
disqualification issue was not actually privy to any of the confidential
information that his or her prior law firm received from the party now seeking
disqualification of his or her present firm." 3 7 As such, uncontroverted
affidavits stating that other lawyers in the former firm entirely handled the
firm's representation or "clearly and effectively show[ing] that .

.

. [the

relevant attorney] had no knowledge of the confidences and secrets of the
client" will defeat the presumption.138 In evaluating rebuttal evidence, courts

learned confidential information in their work . . [for their previous client] that
would be of significance in their representation of their present clients.
State ex rel. Ogden Newspapers, Inc. v. Wilkes, 482 S.E.2d 204, 208 (W. Va. 1996).
133. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 588 F.2d at 224 (emphasis added); see also, e.g., State ex
rel. Keenan v. Hatcher, 557 S.E.2d 361, 368 (W. Va. 2001) (quoting this language).
134. Nelson v. Green Builders, Inc., 823 F. Supp. 1439, 1446 (E.D. Wis. 1993).
135. Freeman v. Chi. Musical Instrument Co., 689 F.2d 715, 722 (7th Cir. 1982); see also
Edwards v. 3600 Commc'ns, 189 F.R.D. 433, 435 (D. Nev. 1999) ("The doctrine of imputed
disqualification flows from the belief that client confidences and legal matters are often
discussed by attorneys working within the confines of the same law firm."). The doctrine stems
from canons four and nine of the ABA's Code of Professional Responsibility, the Model Rules'
predecessor. N. Am. Philips Corp. v. Am. Vending Sales, Inc., No. 93 C 3261, 1993 WL 473630,
at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 15, 1993) (citing In re Sharpe, 98 B.R. 337, 340 (N.D. Ill. 1989)), overruled
on other grounds, 35 F.3d 1576 (7th Cir. 1994).
136. See, e.g., Nat'l Med. Enters. v. Godbey, 924 S.W.2d 123, 131 (Tex. 1996); Henriksen
v. Great Am. Savings & Loan, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 184, 186 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1992); see also
Note, ProvingBreach ofFormer-ClientConfidentiality, 131 HARV. L. REv. 582, 589-90 (2017).
137. Nelson, 823 F. Supp. at 1447 (citing Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417, 420 (7th
Cir. 1983)); see also Freeman, 689 F.2d at 722-23 (citing Novo Terapeutisk Laboratorium v.
Baxter Travenol Labs., 607 F.2d 186, 197 (7th Cir. 1979)).
138. Freeman, 689 F.2d at 723; see Edwards, 189 F.R.D. at 435-36.
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commonly consider the size of the lawyer's firm, his or her area of
specialization and position within the firm, and the demeanor and credibility
of witnesses at any evidentiary hearing held.1 39 Assuming this test's threshold
is passed, "it is unnecessary for the movant to prove that the attorney in
question actually received during the course of his former employment
confidential information relevant to matters involved in the subsequent
representation."1 40 A genuine threat, not even an actual materialized
disclosure, satisfies its requirements. 141
c.

Confidential Information: Federal Common Law & Model
Rule 1.9(c)
i.

Elements

"[E]stablishing a substantial relationship between the attorney's former
and current representations is not the only way a former client can disqualify
his former attorney."1 42 Instead, under Model Rule 1.9(c),1 43 disqualification
may be warranted if the former attorney actually possesses relevant
confidential information, a scenario which threatens to undercut a lawyer's
equally sacred duty to protect client confidences. 144 Stated somewhat

139. Freeman, 689 F.2d at 723; see also, e.g., Mitchell v. Metro. Life Ins., No. 01 CIV.
2112 (WHP), 2002 WL 441194, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2002); Decora Inc. v. DW
Wallcovering, Inc., 899 F. Supp. 132, 140-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
140. LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. Lake Cty., 703 F.2d 252, 255 (7th Cir. 1983) (citing Schloetter
v. Railoc of Ind., Inc., 546 F.2d 706, 710 (7th Cir. 1976)).
141. Cf Gov't of India v. Cook Indus., 569 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1978) ("[A] court should
not require proof that an attorney actually had access to or received privileged information while
representing the client in a prior case.").
142. Islander E. Rental Program v. Ferguson, 917 F. Supp. 504, 510 (S.D. Tex. 1996)
(discussing In re Am. Airlines, Inc., 972 F.2d 605, 615 (5th Cir. 1992)); see also ANNOTATED
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT 146 (AM. BAR Ass'N 1999).
143. Per Model Rule 1.9(c):
[a] lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter or whose present or
former firm has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter: (1)
use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the former
client except as these Rules would permit or require with respect to a client, or
when the information has become generally known; or (2) reveal information
relating to the representation except as these Rules would permit or require with
respect to a client.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r 1.9(c) (AM. BAR Ass'N 2017).
144. See In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether ("MTBE") Prods. Liab. Litig., 438 F. Supp. 2d
305, 308-09 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Islander E. Rental Program, 917 F. Supp. at 510; cf Parker v.
Rowan Cos., No. CivA. 03-545, 2003 WL 22208569, at *4 (E.D. La. Sept. 22, 2003)
("Disqualification motions based on a threat to confidential information are not viewed with any
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differently, "a lawyer representing a client in a matter may not use confidential
client information if doing so will adversely affect a material interest of the
former client, even though that matter is not substantially related to a former
representation."1

45

ii.

Convergence with andDivergencefrom Substantial
Relationship Test

In these kinds of cases, this test both echoes and diverges from the
substantial-relationship one. Unlike the latter, no rebuttable presupposition
attaches, and the accused can only satisfy this touchstone by conclusively
pointing to specific confidences related during the prior representation and
how they could be used to the disadvantage of the accused in the subsequent
representation.146 Proof of "secrets gained in prior employment," no more and
no less, will be enough. 147 Arguably, in those circuits in which the mere
possibility of confidential information's transfer is insufficient to justify
disqualification, the two tests have been merged into one.1 48 Conversely, as
with the substantial relationship test, a lawyer's disqualification upon

less scrutiny than substantial relationship motions.") (suggesting this test also requires proof of
an attorney-client relationship).
145. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 132 cmt. a (AM. LAW
INST. 2000) (emphasis added); see also Clark v. Bank of New York, 801 F. Supp. 1182, 1197
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) ("Generally, an attorney may not knowingly reveal a client confidence if to do
so would disadvantage that client."); cf Simply Fit of N. Am., Inc. v. Poyner, 579 F. Supp. 2d
371, 385 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) ("Court[s] must be mindful of the potential misuse of confidential
information to a client's detriment during subsequent representation of another." (citing
Almonte v. City of Long Beach, No. CV 04-4192 (JS) (JO), 2007 WL 951863, at *3 (E.D.N.Y.
Mar. 27, 2007))).
146. See, e.g., Evans v. Artek Sys. Corp., 715 F.2d 788, 794 (2d Cir. 1983); see also
Roosevelt Irrigation Dist. v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 810 F. Supp.
2d 929, 962-63 (D. Ariz. 2011) (citing United States v. Henke, 222 F.3d 633, 637 (9th Cir.
2000)).
147. Twin Labs., Inc. v. Weider Health & Fitness, No. 89 CIV. 0949 (MBM), 1989 WL
49368, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 1989), cited in, e.g., Clark, 801 F. Supp. at 1197; see also, e.g.,
Tradewinds Airlines, Inc. v. Soros, No. 08 Civ. 5901 (JFK), 2009 WL 1321695, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.
May 12, 2009).
148. In City ofKalamazoo v. Mich. Disposal Serv. Corp., one court noted:
[t]he Sixth Circuit applies a three-part test for attorney disqualification: (1) a
past attorney-client relationship existed between the party seeking
disqualification and the attorney it seeks to disqualify; (2) the subject matter of
those relationships was substantially related; and (3) the attorney acquired
confidential information from the party seeking disqualification.
125 F. Supp. 2d 219, 222 (W.D. Mich. 2000) (citing Dana Corp. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield
of N. Ohio, 900 F.2d 882, 889 (6th Cir. 1990))); Note, supra note 136, at 591-92 (discussing
this approach).
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demonstration of actual confidences' exchange leads to his or her current law
firm's ouster, one's stigma sufficient to taint a firm in toto. 149
d.

OverarchingConcepts: SharedProblems and Principles

Perhaps due to this issue's fact-intensive focus, even cases ostensibly
addressing one type of conflicts evidence similar defects. Seemingly, two
reasons explain these weaknesses' perpetration. First, ambiguity stubbornly
clings to certain terms, inducing repeated denotational confusion and
potentially explaining many inconsistencies. Second, how a court chooses to
define a prior matter or honor corporate distinctions between subsidiaries can
often be the product of happenstance than clear rules. Regardless of the test
employed, the same four issues must be mastered by court and counsel
whenever the possibility of disqualifications rears its ghoulish head.
i.

Undefined Relationships: The Conundrum Posed by
Related Corporations

Perhaps unsurprisingly, the question of whether representation of an
entity amounts to representation of another of its parts (or vice versa) has
occasionally proven wholly determinative. A "lawyer for an organization is
not barred from accepting representation adverse to an affiliate in an unrelated
matter," the Model Rules proclaim, "unless the circumstances are such that
the affiliate should also be considered a client of the lawyer, there is an
understanding between the lawyer and the organizational client that the
lawyer will avoid representation adverse to the client's affiliates, or the
lawyer's obligations to either the organizational client or the new client are
likely to limit materially the lawyer's representation of the other client." 5 0
With no other detail appended, the Model Rules effectively proffer only
"limited guidance regarding when an attorney or firm that undisputedly has
an attorney-client relationship with one entity . .. also has an attorney-client
relationship with an affiliate of that" artificial person.' 5 ' Conversely, one of

149. In re Am. Airlines, Inc., 972 F.2d 605, 614 n.1 (5th Cir. 1992); see also, e.g., United
States v. Guadalupe, 400 F. Supp. 2d 536, 539-40 (W.D.N.Y. 2005) ("It is well settled that the
knowledge of a single attorney within a firm is to be imputed to the entire firm." (quoting
Edwards v. Gould Paper Corp. Long Term Disability Plan, 352 F. Supp. 2d 376, 381 (E.D.N.Y.
2005))).
150. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r 1.7 cmt. 34 (AM. BAR. Ass'N 2017) (emphasis
added); see also Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co. v. St. Johns Bank & Trust Co., No. 4:08CV-1433 CAS, 2009 WL 3069101, at *5 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 22, 2009) (citing comment).
151. Kristen Salvatore DePalma & Emily V. Burton, Engaging with the Realities of the
CorporateFamily, 12 DEL. L. REv. 133, 133 (2011).
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the more comprehensive elaborations of this standard offered by a state bar
enumerates several specific factors, but does so in an eminently equivocal
fashion. 152 As a result, the factors stressed within the few cases bedeviled by
this issue frequently vary, though the at least six-(1) whether the subsidiaries
were "inextricably intertwined" with its parent company; (2) whether the
parent controlled the legal affairs of the subsidiary; (3) whether the
subsidiaries have similar management; (4) whether they share headquarters,
corporate principals and business philosophy; (5) whether they have the same
legal department; and (6) whether senior officers have the same titles in the
different subsidiaries-reappear in case after case. 153 At present, "whether a
lawyer represents a corporate affiliate of his client, for purposes of [Model]
Rule 1.7, depends not upon any clear-cut per se rule but rather upon the
particular circumstances" to which a court accords significance,1 54 their
hesitance amplified by today's world of "national or multi-national public
corporations owning or partially owning subsidiaries which may also be
national or multi-national." 5 5
ii.

Undefined Term: "ConfidentialInformation"

Problematically, no single definition of "confidential information," a
standard relevant to both tests, exists. 156 Certainly, the term is not coterminous
with the more loaded phrase "privileged information,"' 5 7 even if the former
clearly subsumes the latter. 15 The Restatement, for one, broadly defines it to
include "information relating to representation of a client, other than

152. See N.Y. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmts. 34A-34B (N.Y. STATE BAR Ass'N
2017).
153. Ramada Franchise Sys. v. Hotel of Gainesville Assocs., 988 F. Supp. 1460, 1462-63
(N.D. Ga. 1997) (quoting Pennwalt Corp. v. Plough, Inc., 85 F.R.D. 264, 267 (D. Del. 1980));
see also, e.g., Goodlett v. Paul Revere Life Ins., No. C97-0089, 2000 WL 34027916, at *2 (N.D.
Iowa Jan. 15, 2000) (quoting Ramada, 988 F. Supp. at 1462).
154. Avocent Redmond Corp. v. Rose Elecs., 491 F. Supp. 2d 1000, 1006 (W.D. Wash.
2007) (quoting ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof 1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 390 (1995)).
155. Ramada, 988 F. Supp. at 1462; see also, e.g., Goodlett, 2000 WL 34027916, at *2
(quoting Ramada, 988 F. Supp. at 1462).
156. Whether confidentiality even deserves its throne is a question better left to another
day. See generally Dru Stevenson, Against Confidentiality, 48 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 337 (2014)
(discussing the negatives of confidentiality).
157. See Phoenix Founders, Inc. v. Marshall, 887 S.W.2d 831, 834 (Tex. 1994)
("[V]irtually any information relating to a case should be considered confidential . . . .").
158. See, e.g., Cheng v. GAF Corp., 631 F.2d 1052, 1059 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing Bd. of
Educ. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1246 (2d Cir. 1979)), vacated, 450 U.S. 903 (1981).
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information that is generally known."' 59 It thus does not include data
previously made available to the general public, such as information contained
in court filings, documents previously produced in discovery in prior
litigation, or readily available from corporate shareholder reports or
websites. 160 At the same time, client information communicated from a client
to an attorney is always "confidential" within the meaning of Model Rule
1.9(c) even "if otherwise disseminated or already in the public domain."161 To
a limited extent, the definition utilized in the leading expert disqualification
cases162 can help in this lexicographical exercise.163
iii.

Shared Presumption Under Federal Law: Law Firm
Unity

The assumption "that particular individuals in a law firm freely share their
client's confidences with one another" governs regardless of the test at
issue.1 64 This hoary presumption makes it "unnecessary ... to prove that the
attorney in question actually received during the course of his former
employment confidential information relevant to matters involved in the

159. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 59 (AM. LAW INST.
2000); see also City of El Paso v. Salas-Porras Soule, 6 F. Supp. 2d 616, 624-25 (W.D. Tex.
1998) (finding that information regarding "financial assets and dealings" that could form the
basis for impeachment qualifies for the confidential tag).
160. See, e.g., Med. Diagnostic Imaging, PLLC v. CareCore Nat'l, LLC, 542 F. Supp. 2d
296,315 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); see also Abney v. Wal-Mart, 984 F. Supp. 526, 530 (E.D. Tex. 1997).
For this reason, the risk that an attorney may cross-examine a former client based on such
information is rarely sufficient to disqualify that attorney. Med. DiagnosticImaging, PLLC, 542
F. Supp. 2d at 315.
161. Twenty-First Century Rail Corp. v. N.J. Transit Corp., 17 A.3d 213, 223 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2011) (construing state equivalent of Model Rule 1.9(c)), rev'don othergrounds,
44 A.3d 592 (N.J. 2012).
162. See United States ex rel Cherry Hill Convalescent Ctr. v. Healthcare Rehab Sys.,
which stated that:
[c]onfidential information, in the context of expert disqualification, includes:
'discussion of the [retaining party's] strategies in the litigation, the kinds of expert
[the party] expected to retain, [the party's] views of the strengths and weaknesses of
each side, the role of each of the [party's] witnesses to be hired, and anticipated
defenses.'
994 F. Supp. 244, 250 (D.N.J. 1997) (alterations in original) (quoting Koch Ref. Co. v. Jennifer
L. Boudreaux MV, 85 F.3d 1178, 1182 (5th Cir. 1996)).
163. But see Weaver v. Mobile Diagnostech, Inc., No. 02-1719, 2009 WL 1230297, at *9
(W.D. Pa. Apr. 30, 2009) ("The standard for disqualification of an expert is much different than
that applicable to disqualification of counsel, in view of their distinct roles.").
164. Freeman v. Chi. Musical Instrument Co., 689 F.2d 715, 722 (7th Cir. 1982).
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subsequent representation." 6 5 Instead, disqualification must follow if
screening devices were not fully or timely employed;1 66 at that point, only a
truly insurmountable barrier to the passage of information, one whose erection
predates the lawyer's involvement, can save the law firm from this
presumption's operation.1 67 In the absence of such institutional mechanisms,
attorneys whose former law firms once represented their current opponents
must be removed.1 68

iv.

SharedFactor: "FiduciaryRelationship"

"Disqualification does not necessarily require counsel to have previously
represented the same entity." 69 Instead, so long as a party submitted
confidential information to a lawyer and did so with the reasonable belief that
this attorney was acting on its behalf or to advance its interests in the course
of a relationship marked by indicia of high trust, the requisite bond arose. 7 0

165. LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. Cty. of Lake, 703 F.2d 252, 255 (7th Cir. 1983) (citing
Schloetter v. Railoc of Ind., Inc., 546 F.2d 706, 710 (7th Cir. 1976)); accord, e.g., City of
Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 440 F. Supp. 193, 211 (N.D. Ohio 1977); see
also, e.g., Trs. for the Flint Plumbing & Pipefitting Indus. Health Care Fund v. Premier Plumbing
& Heating, Inc., No. 07-CV-14443, 2008 WL 2858475, at *1 (E.D. Mich. July 23, 2008)
(observing that Michigan's Rule of Professional Conduct 1.9(a) does not require an actual
acquisition of confidential information); In re Marks & Goergens, Inc., 199 B.R. 922, 925 (E.D.
Mich. 1996) (distinguishing Dana Corp. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Mut. of N. Ohio, 900 F.2d
882 (6th Cir. 1990), for this very reason).
166. Cobb Publ'g v. Hearst Corp., 907 F. Supp. 1038, 1050 & n. 10 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (first
citing United States v. Goot, 894 F.2d 231, 235 (7th Cir. 1990); then citing Cromley v. Bd. of
Educ., 17 F.3d 1059, 1065 (7th Cir. 1994)).
167. See Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417, 421 (7th Cir. 1983); cf RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 123 (AM. LAW INST. 2000) (summarizing the
standards for determining whether affiliated lawyers may avoid disqualification).
168. See Manning v. Waring, Cox, James, Sklar and Allen, 849 F.2d 222, 227 (6th Cir.
1988); Leathermon v. Grandview Mem'l Gardens, Inc., No. 4:07-cv-137-SEB-WGH, 2010 WL
1381893, at *9 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 31, 2010); Papanicolaou v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 720 F. Supp.
1080, 1087 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
169. In re Butler, 987 S.W.2d 221, 225 (Tex. App. 1999) (construing the state equivalent
of Model Rule 1.9); see also, e.g., Gen-Cor, LLC v. Buckeye Corrugated, Inc., 111 F. Supp. 2d
1049, 1055 (S.D. Ind. 2000) ("[C]ourts are likely to find a violation of [Indiana Rule of
Professional Conduct] Rule 1.7 and like provisions when a firm represents a party opposing a
corporate relation of one of its currentclients without consent ...
(emphasis added)); Gould,
Inc. v. Mitsui Mining & Smelting Co., 738 F. Supp. 1121, 1125-26 (N.D. Ohio 1990) (finding
a conflict when a law firm represented an entity in a suit against an entity whose subsidiary it
represented in unrelated matters).
170. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311, 1319-20 (7th
Cir. 1978) (holding an implied attorney-client relationship was present); In re Gabapentin Patent
Litig., 407 F. Supp. 2d 607, 614 (D.N.J. 2005) (holding an implied attorney-client relationship
was present).
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In these cases, "the deciding factor" is not what a contract said or a lawyer
thought, then or now, but "what the prospective client [or party] thought when
he[, she, or it] made the disclosure."' A clear record that demonstrates "a
longstanding series of interactions" between one or more attorneys and one or
more former firms' clients "which have more likely than not coalesced to
create a basic understanding of [the objecting party's] modus operandi,
patterns of operations, decision-making process, and the like" will be enough
to establish the kind of "fiduciary relationship" required for either test's
utilization. 172 The very existence of "a climate for the disclosure of relevant
confidential information" will suffice,1 73 the requisite "professional
relationship ... not dependent on the payment of fees nor ... the execution of
74
a formal contract."1

IV.

GUIDELINES FOR APPLICATION: COUNSEL CHEAT SHEET

A.

Relevant Factors

Whatever the test employed, courts habitually pore over the same factors.
Most will first analyze the movant's: (1) standing to challenge the lawyer's
conduct; (2) diligence in bringing the motion; (3) knowledge of the
circumstances; (4) fault or misconduct; (5) motive in bringing the motion; and
(6) potential prejudice if the motion is denied. ' They will then turn to the
relevant lawyer's: (1) knowledge about the conflict of interest or other
misconduct; (2) motives; (3) ethical violation or appearance of impropriety;
(4) violation's severity; and (5) occasionally, potential prejudice (flowing to
the lawyer or lawyer's firm) should the court grant the disqualification

171. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 580 F.2d at 1319 n.14 (quoting RAYMOND L. WISE,
LEGAL ETHICS 284 (2d ed. 1970)); see also, e.g., Landmark Am. Ins. v. Deerfield Constr., Inc.,
No. 15 C 1785, 2017 WL 157858, at *13 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 12, 2017) (collecting case law, albeit
finding no such relationship due to the absence of any contact between lawyer and defendant);
DCA Food Indus. v. Tasty Foods, Inc., 626 F. Supp. 54, 59-60 (W.D. Wis. 1985) (canvassing
the Seventh Circuit's cases).
172. Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co. v. Norton Co., 113 F.R.D. 588, 591 (D. Minn. 1986);
see also, e.g., Koch Ref. Co. v. Jennifer L. Boudreaux MV, 85 F.3d 1178, 1182 (5th Cir. 1996)
(defining a confidential relationship necessary for winning an expert's disqualification based on
a case); Rhodes v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 558 F. Supp. 2d 660, 666 (S.D. W. Va. 2008)
(utilizing this definition in the attorney-disqualification context).
173. Kaselaan & D'Angelo Assocs. v. D'Angelo, 144 F.R.D. 235, 243-44 (D.N.J. 1992).
174. Steines v. Menrisky, 222 F. Supp. 3d 648, 652 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (citing Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 580 F.2d at 1317).
175. See, e.g., FMC Techs. v. Edwards, 420 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1156-57 (W.D. Wash.
2006); Colyer v. Smith, 50 F. Supp. 2d 966, 971 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (citing In re Appeal of
Infotechnology, Inc., 582 A.2d 215, 221 (Del. 1999)).
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motion.1 76 In contrast to this panoply, the elements centering on a lawyer's
client, the very person who faces the loss of their chosen attorney, number
two: the client's (1) knowledge; and (2) even more critically, potential
prejudice should the court grant the disqualification motion. 7 7 Despite their
paucity, courts treat these two factors as decisive.17 Finally, in many
disqualification cases, courts examine various characteristics of the lawyer's
firm, mostly focusing on the effectiveness of the relevant firms' screening
mechanism. The features assessed in determining the necessity and/or
effectiveness of any screen include both the past and present firms' (1) size,
(2) physical layout, (3) hierarchy or structure, (4) knowledge, and (5) devices
themselves, including their timeliness, strength, and notice. 179
B. Required Proof
Based on the foregoing, assuming an attorney-client relationship can be
established,8 0 an attorney striving to disqualify another per the substantialrelationship or confidential-information test faces a two-part challenge.
First, a close relationship akin to that between an attorney and a client
must be established"' by reliance on an endlessly variable menagerie. 182 In
general, as noted above, 8 3 proof of "a climate for the disclosure of relevant

176. See, e.g., In re Meador, 968 S.W.2d 346, 351-52 (Tex. 1998); Ex parte AmSouth
Bank, N.A., 589 So. 2d 715, 719 (Ala. 1991).
177. See Kala v. Aluminum Smelting & Ref. Co., 688 N.E.2d 258, 267 (Ohio 1998);
Alexander v. Primerica Holdings, Inc., 822 F. Supp. 1099, 1118 (D.N.J. 1993); Zimmerman v.
Duggan, 81 B.R. 296, 301 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
178. See, e.g., Weeks v. Samsung Heavy Indus., 909 F. Supp. 582, 585 (N.D. Ill. 1996)
(stressing that disqualification would remove a lawyer "with substantial knowledge of an
involvement in the case and require a substitute attorney to perform work that would most likely
duplicate" that undertaken by plaintiffs disqualified attorney); CenTra, Inc. v. Chandler Ins.,
540 N.W.2d 318, 326 (Neb. 1995) ("[A] party may be substantially prejudiced because its new
attorney must litigate against an opposing counsel who inarguably is more familiar and more
facile with the case.").
179. Cromley v. Bd. of Educ., 17 F.3d 1059, 1065 (7th Cir. 1994).
180. Essex Chem. Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 993 F. Supp. 241, 252 (D.N.J.
1998); see also 48 AM. JUR. 2DProofof Facts § 15 (2017) (collecting the factors that courts in
a variety of jurisdictions have used to support an attorney-client relationship, including an
attorney's receipt of, or attempt to receive confidential information or records despite the
absence of any formal joint defense agreement or explicit documents establishing an attorneyclient relationship).
181. Essex Chem. Corp., 993 F. Supp. at 253.
182. See generally 48 AM. JUR. 2D ProofofFacts §§ 7-17 (providing various factors and
considerations used in determining the existence of an attorney-client relationship).
183. See supra Section III.C.2.d.iv.
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confidential information" will prove enough. 8 4 Importantly, the finding of
such "a professional relationship is not dependent on the payment of fees
nor ... the execution of a formal contract.""' Even adversity between the
interests of current plaintiffs and a former aligned party, if represented by the
same law firm, can be cited as support for the prior existence of a climate
whereby relevant confidential information was probably disclosed so as to
ensure plaintiffs' effective representation. 186
Second, the kind of representation must be precisely, yet vaguely,
delineated. In general, a party seeking an attorney's disqualification must
show that the latter did not represent its current opponent "in a narrowlydefined, single-issue lawsuit or ... simply assisted a client in settlement
discussions in a small number of cases.""' As such, a record demonstrating
"a longstanding series of interactions" between past counsel and a former
client will easily satisfy either test's predicate requirement.1' Hence, if a
former client can demonstrate that the relevant attorney's extensive
involvement in at least one case may have made him or her aware of its
underlying problems or trial strategy, information that could bear on the
present matter, it can satisfy its burden despite a law firm's size, the limited
exposure to internal data enjoyed by that attorney's former office, and his or

184. Kaselaan & D'Angelo Assoc. v. D'Angelo, 144 F.R.D. 235, 243-44 (D.N.J. 1992).
185. Steines v. Menrisky, 222 F. Supp. 3d 648, 652 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (citing Westinghouse
Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311, 1317 (7th Cir. 1978)).
186. Steel v. Gen. Motors Corp., 912 F. Supp. 724, 736-37 (D.N.J. 1995).
187. Mitchell v. Metro Life Ins., 2002 WL 441194, at *5 (S.D.N.Y Mar. 20, 2002); see
also Matthews v. LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene & MacRae, 902 F. Supp. 26, 31 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
(motion to disqualify denied where plaintiff s lawyers, formerly associated with defendant law
firm, did not possess confidential information about the subject matter of the lawsuit and only
participated in two or three settlement discussions unrelated to the current lawsuit); Vestron, Inc.
v. Nat'l Geographic Soc'y, 750 F. Supp. 586, 595 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (motion to disqualify denied
where in a prior representation plaintiff s law firm only acquired confidences about defendant's
"general litigation posture in trademark suits," a matter not relevant to the current breach of
contract suit); Beck v. Bd. of Regents, 568 F. Supp. 1107, 1112 (D. Kan. 1983) (motion to
disqualify denied where the only evidence of substantial relationship offered by the movant was
type of claim asserted in two disparate actions, a prior employment discrimination action and a
current medical negligence and premises liability action, and no effort was made to show the
relevance to the pending action of any confidential information communicated during the prior
representation).
188. Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co. v. Norton Co., 113 F.R.D. 588, 591 (D. Minn. 1986);
see also, e.g., Koch Ref. Co. v. Jennifer L. Boudreaux MV, 85 F.3d 1178, 1182 (5th Cir. 1996)
(citing Marvin Lumber, 113 F.R.D. at 591; and then citing Mayer v. Dell, 139 F.R.D 1, 3 (D.D.C.
1991)) (defining a confidential relationship necessary for winning an expert's disqualification
based on a case); Rhodes v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 558 F. Supp. 2d 660, 665-66 (S.D.
W. Va. 2008) (utilizing this definition in the attorney-disqualification context).
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her own limited caseload. 8 9 This principle applies even if the attorney
represented an aligned, yet separate, co-defendant 9 0 or obtained the
information after the striking of a joint-defense agreement, whether formally
or informally;191 prior demonstrable involvement in a "joint venture" can
serve.1 92 in other words, the kind of relationship that yoked party and
counselor, both "the nature of the work performed" and "the circumstances"
which held when the relevant information was divulged, matter most,1 93 its
apparent depth more important than its demonstrable length.
Third, the general types of information that one or more of a client's
agents could have conveyed to that counselor or could have been discovered

189. See Carreno v. City of Newark, 834 F. Supp. 2d 217, 228 (D.N.J. 2011) (finding
attorney's access to former client's confidential litigation strategies and processes, settlement
processes and procedures, and receipt and review of internal investigations and files more than
enough to establish the actual, not to mention, presumptive receipt of confidential information);
United States v. Aleman, No. CRIM.EP-04-CR-1509 K, 2004 WL 1834602, at *3 (W.D. Tex.
Aug. 12, 2004) ("[C]onfidential information includes 'unprivileged client information,' defined
as 'all information relating to a client or furnished by the client, other than privileged
information, acquired by the lawyer during the course of or by reason of the representation of
the client."' (citing TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.05(a))); Cordy v.
Sherwin-Williams Co., 156 F.R.D. 575, 584 (D.N.J. 1994) (disqualification may be merited if
trial expert was "privy to [Plaintiffs] trial strategy"); cf CQS ABS Master Fund Ltd. v. MBIA
Inc., No. 12 Civ. 6840 (RJS), WL 3270322, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. June 24, 2013) (stressing that such
facts weaken the presumption of shared confidences but finding the presumption unrebutted
because counsel "offer[ed] no evidence of specific screening procedures"). Certainly, a
multitude of cases in which Vlahakis participated would bolster any such argument, but Ally
"need not prove that 'an attorney actually had access to or received privileged information while
representing the client in a prior case,' because to do so it would have to disclose the very
privileged information it seeks to protect." Panebianco v. First Unum Life Ins., No. 04 Civ. 9331
(JSR), 2005 WL 975835, at *3 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2005) (quoting Gov't of India v. Cook
Indus., 569 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1978)).
190. See GTE N., Inc. v. Apache Prods. Co., 914 F. Supp. 1575, 1579 (N.D. Ill. 1996)
("When information is exchanged between co-defendants and their attorneys," no attorney may
make use of that information "even though that co-defendant is not the one which he represented
in the criminal case." (quoting Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311,
1319 (7th Cir. 1978))).
191. See Roosevelt Irrigation Dist. v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power
Dist., 810 F. Supp. 2d 929, 961-63 (D. Ariz. 2011) (summarizing cases holding that attorney
owes a duty of confidentiality to the former co-defendant as a consequence of a joint defense
agreement, whether implicit or explicit); Kaskie v. Celotex Corp., 618 F. Supp. 696, 699 (N.D.
Ill. 1985) (treating the exchange of confidential information among counsel for co-defendants
under joint defense agreement as creating implied attorney-client relationship).
192. City of Kalamazoo v. Mich. Disposal Serv. Corp., 125 F. Supp. 2d 219, 237 (W.D.
Mich. 2000).
193. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 580 F.2d at 1320; see also, e.g., Black Rush Mining, LLC
v. Black Panther Mining, 840 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1090 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (citing Westinghouse Elec.
Corp. and other cases for the proposition that the sharing of confidential information can
establish an implied attorney-client relationship).
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by the latter must be specified, e.g., tax information, financial data, corporate
organizational formation, etc., and heir relevance to the pending litigation
must be explained.194 "[G]eneral knowledge of.

.

. [a] client's policies and

practices" will always be deemed irrelevant, 195 but not front-row access to a
former client's internal deliberation over "hot button issues," including how
it had structured its policies and procedures to comply with current (and still
binding) law and minimize its liability; 196 knowledge of its private "business
methods," including "who in the company has what information;" 197 or any
of "the particular practices and procedures which are the subject matter of [the
pending] suit."1 98 More likely than not, possible access to the business
strategies of a former client that might put the attorney in a position to acquire
"knowledge casting light on the purpose of later acts and agreements" which
underlie another action will be branded sufficiently confidential to trigger
disqualification,1 99 as would exposure to "domestic distribution strategies" 200
and even "knowledge of private matters gained in confidence" that could
reasonably impart "greater insight and understanding of the significance of
subsequent events in a . . . [similar] context and offer a promising source of

194. See Islander E. Rental Program v. Ferguson, 917 F. Supp. 504, 510 (S.D. Tex. 1996);
cf Twin Labs., Inc. v. Weider Health & Fitness, No. 89 Civ. 0949 (MBM), 1989 WL 49368, at
*3 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 1989) (noting the ethical concerns raised when "[a] lawyer who is exposed
to the business methods of a firm during the course of a government investigation takes away
with him a great deal of information useful in subsequent litigation, such as who in the company
has what information").
195. Watkins v. Trans Union, LLC, 869 F.3d 514, 520 (7th Cir. 2017).
196. Watkins v. Trans Union LLC, No. 2:14-cv- 135-WTL-DKL, 2016 WL 4919999, at *5
(S.D. Ind. Sept. 15, 2016) (stating as much, though opting not to disqualify an attorney due to
the passage of over eleven years), aff'd, 869 F.3d 514.
197. See Carreno v. City of Newark, 834 F. Supp. 2d 217, 228 (D.N.J. 2011); see also,
e.g., Foster Poultry Farms v. Conagra Foods Refrigerated Foods Co., No. CV F 04-5810 AWI
LJO, 2005 WL 2319186, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2005) (finding a sufficiently substantial
relationship when the attorney had confidential information about the client's "business
strategy" and "information about the former client's response in a suit on almost identical
issues").
198. Lavender v. Protective Life Corp., No. 2:15-cv-02275-AKK, 2017 WL 432461, at *6
(N.D. Ala. Jan. 31, 2017) (quoting Hermann v. GutterGuard, Inc., 199 Fed. App'x 745, 753
(11th Cir. 2006)); see also, e.g., SHFL Entm't, Inc. v. DigiDeal Corp., No. 2:12-cv-0 1782GMN-VCF, 2013 WL 178130, at *12 (D. Nev. Jan. 16, 2013) (finding lawyer to have been
privy, based on a series of emails, to "confidential information relating to . . [adverse party's]
policies, procedures, and strategies that were only provided to him due to his confidential
relationship with the company") (quoting Coles v. Arizona Charlie's, 973 F. Supp. 971, 974 (D.
Nev. 1997)).
199. Chugach Elec. Ass'n v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 370 F.2d 441, 443-44 (9th Cir. 1966).
200. Haagen-Dazs Co. v. Perche No! Gelato Inc., 639 F. Supp. 282, 286 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
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discovery." 201 Such evidence can prove the kind of substantial involvement
essential to satisfying not just that test but also the confidential information
one. 202 One need not be too specific "the inquiry into the issues involved in
the prior representation should be as specific as possible without revealing the
confidential client information itself or confidential information concerning
the second client" 203 but must still adduce the general categories of data that
were disseminated and explain their potential yet cognizable import. 204
V.

CONCLUSION

By raising the specter of disqualification in the midst of promotion
practice, a lawyer unavoidably provokes drama and invites invective. In
weighing the propriety of such loaded appeals, federal courts have turned to
the ABA's standards for proper conduct 205 but have also relied upon

201. Chugach Elec. Ass'n, 370 F.2d at 443; see also Dye v. Brown (In re AFI Holding,
Inc.), 355 BR. 139, 154 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 2006) (citing Chugach Elec. Ass'n, 370 F.2d at 443);
State ex rel. Ogden Newspapers, Inc. v. Wilkes, 566 S.E.2d 560, 566 (W. Va. 2002)
(emphasizing Chugach's limitations but finding "the nature of. . . [a] research project, as
described in a confidential memorandum, [to] clearly support[] the presumption
that . . . [attorney] gained some insight into the corporate policies of. . . [adverse party] and its
affiliates" (quoting State ex rel. Ogden Newspapers, Inc., 482 S.E.2d 204, 209 (W. Va. 1996)).
202. See United States v. Smith, 995 F.2d 662, 675-76 (7th Cir. 1993) (affirming the
disqualification of a supervisor of an attorney who conducted a "parallel investigation"); Castillo
v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins., 938 F.2d 776, 781 (7th Cir. 1991) (Cudahy, J., concurring) (noting
that counsel's "several conversations" regarding a matter "indirectly related to the subject of the
present suit" is sufficient to trigger a hearing on disqualification); Schiessle v. Stephens, 717
F.2d 417, 421 (7th Cir. 1983) (finding the presumption to be unrebutted when an attorney
represented his current opponent as a partner and discussed the lawsuit on at least four occasions
during his time at his former law firm).
203. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 132A(d)(iii) (Am.
LAW INST. 2000).
204. See W.R. Grace & Co. v. Gracecare, Inc., 152 F.R.D. 61, 65 (D. Md. 1993) (observing
that, when a plaintiff seeks out an attorney to serve as an expert, it is "reasonable to assume that
that contact took on a confidential character because of . .. [lawyer's] profession and proposed
role alone" even if "[t]he duration of that relationship may have been minimal," "[n]o
confidences regarding a substantially related matter may have passed," "[n]o confidences at all
may have passed," and "[t]he contact may have been nothing more than a job interview"); Stitz
v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 650 F. Supp. 914, 917 (D. Md. 1987) (finding disqualification merited
when attorney's prior work made him familiar with defendant's personnel policies and
procedures and that familiarity could be used to defendant's disadvantage in a current suit); cf
Ross v. Am. Red Cross, No. 2:09-cv-905, 2012 WL 2090511, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 11, 2012)
(determining that the possibility that expert's testimony may involve "client confidences to
which he was exposed during his years as" deputy general counsel more than sufficient to
disqualify him).
205. See Kevlik v. Goldstein, 724 F.2d 844, 846-47, 851 n.4 (1st Cir. 1984); IBM Corp.
v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271, 279 n.2 (3d Cir. 1978); Cent. Milk Prod. Co-op. v. Sentry Foods Stores,
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principles of trustee, fiduciary, and agency law.206 Today's resulting common
law both pledges fealty to presumptions regarding "disclosed confidences"
and "shared confidences" and pays heed to dissonant threads of ratiocination
and policy. Perhaps as a result, beginning with 1953's TC. Theatre
Corporation v. Warner Brothers Pictures,207 confusion over the proper
standard has only deepened. As large and small law firms consolidate into
behemoths, lateral transfers multiply, and more lawyers enter (and depart)
their government apprenticeships at a maddening clip, the resulting miasma
is only more likely to confound those attempting to chart a path in accordance
with this jurisprudence's few identifiable stars. With disqualification such a
potent tool for preserving a client's hallowed confidences, no practicing
lawyer can afford such ignorance, for although the power to disqualify "ought
to be exercised with great caution" 208 and "restraint," 209 disqualification is
sometimes "necessary for the preservation of decorum and for the
respectability of the profession" itself.21 0 Else, nightmares do foretell, a
poisoned stain will spread, further befouling an oft-damned profession in fact
as in myth. 21 1

&

Inc., 573 F.2d 988, 992-93 (8th Cir. 1978); NCK Org. v. Bregman, 542 F.2d 128, 136 n.2 (2d
Cir. 1976) (citing Cinema 5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d 1384, 1386 (2d Cir. 1976); and
then citing Hull v. Celanese Corp., 513 F.2d 568, 572 n.12 (2d Cir. 1975)).
206. See Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 567 F.2d 225, 233-34, 237 n.16
(2d Cir. 1977); see also Cinema 5, Ltd., 528 F.2d at 1386 (regarding an attorney as a client's
trustee or fiduciary); Brinkley v. Farmers Elevator Mut. Ins., 485 F.2d 1283, 1286 (10th Cir.
1973) (arguing an attorney functions as an agent).
207. 113 F. Supp. 265, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (birthing the substantial relationship test).
208. Ex parte Burr, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 529, 531 (1824).
209. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44 (1991).
210. Exparte Burr, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 531; see also, e.g., Saldana v. Kmart Corp., 260
F.3d 228, 237-38 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Ex parteBurr, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 531); cf Link v.
Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 629-30 (1962) (observing that "[t]he authority of a federal trial
court to dismiss a plaintiffs action with prejudice because of his failure to prosecute . . is
necessary in order to prevent undue delays in the disposition of pending cases and to avoid
congestion in the calendars of the District Courts").
211. Cf W. Wolfgang Holdheim, The Ways of Mephistopheles, 1 CARDOZO STUD. L.
LITERATURE 211, 214 (1989) (reviewing MICHAEL KILIAN, JURISPRUDENZ ZWISCHEN TECHNE
UND KUNST: VON HIPPOKRATES BIS HEINE: PHILOSOPHISCHES UND LITERARISCHES ZUM
VERHALTNIS KUNST UND RECHT (1987)) ("It is not that the devil is a lawyer.... [I]t is rather

that his characteristics strikingly resemble those that are (and have long been) attributed to the
breed.").
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